

# Inspector General

## United States

## Department *of* Defense



### Special Plans and Operations

Assessment of Planning for Transitioning the  
Security Assistance Mission in Iraq From  
Department of Defense to Department of State  
Authority

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# Inspector General

## United States Department of Defense

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INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
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August 25, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-IRAQ  
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
SUBJECT: Assessment of Planning for Transitioning the Security Assistance Mission in Iraq  
From Department of Defense to Department of State Authority (Report No. SPO-2011-008)

We are providing this report for review and comment. We considered comments from the Joint Staff, Chief, Joint Education and Doctrine Division (JS/J7), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) when preparing the final report.

DOD Directive 7650.3 requires all recommendations be resolved promptly. The Joint Staff/J7's comments were responsive. However, the comments from USF-I were partially responsive to Recommendation 1.b. We request additional information from USCENTCOM (on behalf of USF-I) when the subject reports are completed. Additionally, the comments of USCENTCOM were non- or partially responsive. We request further comments to Recommendations 1.a., 2.a., 2.b., and revised Recommendations 3.a.(1), 3.a.(2), and 3.a.(3). We request additional comments by September 30, 2011 to those recommendations (see classified Annex to Appendix E).

Please provide comments that conform to requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3. If possible send management comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to [spo@dodig.mil](mailto:spo@dodig.mil). Copies of management comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official in your organization. We cannot accept /Signed/ symbol in place of an actual signature. If you send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to Mr. Joe A. Baker at (703) 604-9170 (DSN 664-9170) or Mr. Michael McClellan at (703) 604-9145 (DSN 664-9145).

  
Kenneth P. Moorefield  
Deputy Inspector General  
Special Plans and Operations





## Results in Brief: Assessment of Planning for Transitioning the Security Assistance Mission in Iraq from Department of Defense to Department of State Authority

### What We Did

Our purpose was to determine whether:

- U.S. Government goals, objectives, plans, and guidance were issued and operative for transitioning the Security Assistance Mission in Iraq from DoD to Department of State authority
- Ongoing efforts to provide security assistance to Iraq were adversely impacted by the drawdown

We visited or contacted governmental organizations in the U.S. and in Iraq that were responsible for providing security assistance to Iraq. We also visited the Office of Military Cooperation in Egypt and the U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia.

### What We Found

At the time of our assessment, detailed goals, objectives, plans, and guidance had been sufficiently developed and were operative for transitioning security assistance from DoD to Department of State authority. Planning for establishing an enduring Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq received a lower priority to planning for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The planning for the Office of Security Cooperation succeeded largely due to the singular efforts of an *ad hoc* cadre of strategic planners operating within United States Forces-Iraq.

Despite determining that detailed planning to accomplish transitioning the security assistance function was sufficiently developed and operative, we identified general shortcomings in joint doctrine. Also, an up to date U.S. Central Command Theater Security Cooperation Plan as it applied to Iraq could have better informed the planning process.

### What We Recommend

- U.S. Central Command:
  - Issue interim theater level campaign, security cooperation, and Iraq-specific country planning details.
  - Assess sufficiency of internal procedures and resources for Iraq-specific security cooperation related planning and guidance and lessons learned efforts.
  - Direct a detailed case study of Partnership Strategy Group-Iraq security assistance transition related efforts in Iraq.
  - Sponsor a formal doctrine development proposal that supports transitioning a complex contingency from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities in a non-permissive security environment.
- Director, Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J-7, assess joint doctrine's consistency with DoD stability operations and transition policy.

### Management Comments and Our Response

In a classified response, the Deputy Director for Plans, responding for USCENTCOM, non-concurred with most recommendations. Our response to their comments is contained in a separate classified Annex. Commander, USF-I, concurred with their recommendations. The Chief, Joint Education and Doctrine Division (JS/J7) partially concurred, and based on their comments we changed our recommendations at Observation 3. We request that U.S. Central Command and the Chief, Joint Education and Doctrine Division (JS/J7) provide additional comments to the final report by September 30, 2011. Please see the table on the following page.

## Recommendations Table

Client	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Commander, U.S. Central Command	2.a., 2.b., 3.a.(1), 3.a.(2), 3.a.(3)	1.a.
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq Commander, USCENTCOM	1.b.	
Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J7	3.b.	

**Total Recommendations in this Report: 8**

**Please provide comments by September 30, 2011.**

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# Introduction

## ***Objectives of This Project***

Our assessment objectives were to determine whether DoD goals, objectives, plans, and guidance were issued and operative for the transition of the Iraqi Security Assistance Mission from Department of Defense authority to an Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) under Department of State/Chief of Mission authority.

Our team additionally sought to determine if efforts to provide a continuing security assistance capability with respect to the Government of Iraq (GoI) had been adversely affected by the execution of the first phase of the drawdown of U.S. forces by U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I).

## ***Background***

Since 2004, the requirement to eventually transition security assistance functions in Iraq from Department of Defense to Department of State (DOS) authority has been evident. In May 2004, National Security Presidential Directive 36<sup>1</sup> stipulated that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense would, at the appropriate time, jointly decide when those functions would transfer to a security assistance organization under the authority of the Secretary of State and the Chief of Mission.

On November 17, 2008, the governments of the U.S. and Iraq signed two agreements outlining basic terms of their strategic relationship: “Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq” [the Strategic Framework Agreement]; and, “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq” [the Security Agreement]. Both agreements entered into force on January 1, 2009, with Article 24 of the Security Agreement stating that “all U.S. forces shall withdraw from Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.”

On February 27, 2009, in remarks delivered at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, President Obama announced that the U.S. combat mission in Iraq would end by August 31, 2010, and that all U.S. troops would depart by the end of 2011.<sup>2</sup> In pledging to remove all combat forces by August 2010, the President stated that the mission would change from combat to “supporting the Iraqi government and its Security Forces as they take the absolute lead in securing their country.”

No more than 50,000 U.S. troops were to remain after August 2010, and through December 2011 these troops were to serve as a transitional force with three main functions:

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<sup>1</sup> National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” provided for U.S. operations in Iraq after termination of the Coalition Provisional Authority and re-establishment of diplomatic relations in Iraq.

<sup>2</sup> Remarks of President Barack Obama (as prepared for delivery), “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq,” February 27, 2009. Downloaded from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-n-dash-responsibly-ending-war-iraq>, on July 14, 2010. President’s speech at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, outlined the strategy and phased approach for the responsible drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and development of an enduring strategic partnership with Iraq.

- training, equipping, and advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF);
- conducting targeted counter-terrorism missions; and,
- protecting our ongoing civilian and military efforts within Iraq.

Thereafter, the U.S. committed to pursue sustained diplomacy to build a lasting strategic relationship between the two countries.

## ***Initial Planning for Transitioning Security Assistance***

The President's pronouncement set in motion several actions. In March 2009, in support of developing the President's 2012 budget, the National Security Council issued a series of special requests for information to determine what resources were needed to execute the drawdown. In August 2009, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a planning order to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) for drawdown planning from Iraq and associated theater posture updates. Because Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I, since re-established as USF-I), had responsibility for operations in Iraq, USCENTCOM deferred most force drawdown planning to them, including planning for security assistance mission transition. USCENTCOM retained responsibility for broader planning within their theater area of responsibility, to include overarching theater security cooperation planning.

Under that arrangement, USF-I developed their main military plan, Operation Order (OPORD) 10-01, effective January 1, 2010. To flexibly sequence the campaign, the approach included implementing OPORD 10-01 through an incremental series of major fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to accommodate specific events, campaign phases, and emerging operational realities. In January 2011, USF-I superseded OPORD 10-01 with OPORD 11-01. OPORD 11-01 incorporated relevant portions of previous orders and further revised and updated their guidance. USF-I and American Embassy-Baghdad had also jointly issued an updated Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) in November 2009 that remains current to date. In addition to many other activities, these two plan series, USF-I OPORDs and the JCP, established the planning basis for most security assistance transition activities in Iraq.

Although USF-I initiated development of new plans at the field command level, USCENTCOM delayed issuing updated Theater Campaign and Theater Security Cooperation Plans, to include related Iraq Country Plan details. Reportedly, those delays arose from DoD directions that USCENTCOM integrate theater security cooperation elements into their Theater Campaign Plan.<sup>3</sup> As of April 2011, updated theater level plans were being prepared but had not been issued.

In early 2009, MNF-I (now USF-I) established the Partnership Strategy Group-Iraq (PSG-I), a small cadre of personnel at Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I, now Deputy Commanding General Advising and Training (DCG (A-T)). PSG-I was stood up at least partially to offset the lack of more detailed guidance from higher echelons. Besides identifying post-2011 Iraq security, political, and economic factors and interdependencies which defined a range of USF-I transition challenges, PSG-I also executed functions that were normally performed by higher echelons.

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<sup>3</sup> The current Joint Staff Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and Office of the Secretary of Defense Guidance for Employment of the Force directives were cited as precipitating USCENTCOM planning delays.

An appreciation of projected Iraq-related security assistance priorities enabled PSG-I to prepare Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) options for USF-I. Once presented, these options facilitated key senior DoD and important interagency decisions. This performance eventually led to PSG-I being charged by USF-I with executing other planning to prepare for supporting the longer range, post-2011 goal of building an enduring strategic partnership between the two countries. PSG-I prepared the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq transition concept plan that was incorporated as a supporting plan into USF-I FRAGO 10-01.4. USF-I OPORD 11-01 included an updated version of the OSC-I transition concept plan.

## ***Areas Requiring Extended Oversight***

While current planning was generally sufficient for establishing and transitioning the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq, we identified several areas that warranted continued scrutiny and oversight. Generally, these were being sufficiently addressed at the time of this report but, if not kept in check, had the potential to significantly influence or negate key planning assumptions. Failure to satisfy key assumptions could have major impacts in executing the OSC-I transition plan. Although appropriate officials were aware of these challenges and were addressing them, we considered them important enough to emphasize for continued attention and oversight.

## **Coordination with the Government of Iraq**

The ability of DoD and DOS personnel to straightforwardly engage their Iraqi governmental counterparts was one critical area of importance. In the absence of an agreed government-to-government understanding with respect to the nature of the post-2011 strategic relationship with the GoI, DoD and DOS personnel had not been able or had been reluctant to openly engage their GoI counterparts to address key planning issues regarding the scope of an OSC-I. DoD and DOS representatives had consequently been unable to complete essential detailed planning for establishing the OSC-I, to include finalizing its fully certified role, structure, deployment in-country, security and other organizational issues.

Although a longer term security agreement with Iraq still is lacking, progress has been made to improve coordination with the GoI. Specifically, in August 2010 the National Security Council produced a communication strategy with Iraq. Building on this, the USF-I OPORD 11-01 included an expanded annex covering communications with the GoI. Both of these documents provided the beginnings of a pathway to further communication with the GoI, even in the absence of a follow-on security agreement. Other DoD and DOS policy level components appeared aware of the importance of thorough communication and were fully committed to expeditiously resolving the situation.

## **Office of the Secretary of Defense Support for OSC-I**

More detailed senior Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level policy and guidance support for establishing the OSC-I was another area that officials were already addressing. Immediately following the President's withdrawal pronouncement in February 2009, senior OSD levels had reportedly been reticent to provide timely security cooperation policy guidance and related authorities for post-2011 Iraq. We determined this initial hesitancy was caused by senior policy level unwillingness to limit strategic options before the nature of the relationship between the U.S. and the new GoI could be better established. Recent evidence indicated that higher DoD

level interagency coordination had improved over what had been reported to us early in this assessment, though it still appeared more protracted than the coordination that we observed locally in Iraq between USF-I and U.S. Embassy counterparts.

Positive steps were being taken at senior levels to preclude extended delays that could negate key planning assumptions, but it was too soon to assess results of these initiatives. In March 2011, for instance, the Secretary of Defense designated the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) Chief of Staff as the Senior DoD Iraq Transition Coordinator. In that capacity, the USD(P) Chief of Staff was to serve as the Senior Defense Official coordinating the DoD role during the transition to civilian lead in Iraq. He was also the formal point of contact to receive, coordinate, and respond to the Department of State on Iraq transition issues. Early indications suggested positive impacts were already occurring.

### **Post-transition Security Costs**

Responsibility for security of DoD personnel in Iraq and associated costs was another important area of concern. Faced with existing realities, the U.S. elected to take measures to mitigate adverse impacts of the GoI absorbing the full costs of providing security for U.S. Security Assistance personnel in the immediate, post-2011 timeframe in Iraq. This possibility was additionally recognized in a January 2011 report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.<sup>4</sup>

As part of this arrangement, the Departments of State and Defense agreed that DoD would retain responsibility for security of OSC-I personnel in Iraq for an interim period rather than DOS immediately assuming full responsibility for security of personnel at the end of 2011. Details related to that arrangement must still be determined. While it increases the proportional costs DoD would pay, it reportedly reduces the overall costs to the U.S. taxpayer.

Objectively, the GoI was envisioned as having to eventually absorb the full costs of security, as most other countries with whom we engage in security assistance activities were required to do. This interim course of action would facilitate continued ISF progress in attaining desired minimum essential capability levels. It also enables the building of closer military-to-military relationships between the two countries in the immediate, post-2011 environment in Iraq. Details about when, or if, security costs for DoD personnel operating in Iraq would shift to either DOS or the GoI are undetermined at the time of this report but are projected to be formally reviewed annually.

### **Budgeting and Manpower**

Securing funding and manpower resources necessary to establish the OSC-I were other areas being addressed. Key decisions for securing funding and manpower had been protracted for a number of different reasons, mostly related to the considerable uncertainty regarding post-2011 circumstances in Iraq. For example, early 2009 guidance called for including costs of standing up the OSC-I in the President's base FY12 budget submission. But that changed in late 2010, as unknowns about the post-2011 Iraq circumstances continued to impact DoD ability to develop precise estimates and leverage existing DoD strategic budget planning cycles. The Office of

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<sup>4</sup> Iraq: The Transition from a Military Mission to a Civilian-led Effort – A Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign relations, United States Senate. January 31, 2011.

Management and Budget eventually agreed to include those costs in the FY12 Overseas Contingency Operations budget request.

Regarding manpower, permanent positions for the OSC-I had not been established because detailed planning for the OSC-I transition from DoD authority to DOS authority was initiated too late in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System cycle to develop, validate, and resource the positions in a routine manner. The first budget year where permanent positions could be programmed was in FY12, and DoD basically completed that programming activity in the fall of 2010. While the Joint Staff decided establishing the OSC-I would be a “new start,” which would have allowed the Services to program for the positions through FY14, the senior DoD decision made in October 2010 shifted the policy emphasis to manning the OSC-I with temporary, versus permanent, billets. That decision included a provision to periodically review the OSC-I staffing situation but provided no details about how permanent positions would eventually be achieved.

## ***Terminology***

This report uses the following definitions of terms:

**Security Assistance**. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.<sup>5</sup>

**Security Cooperation**. All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.<sup>6</sup>

**Security Cooperation Organizations**. Those DoD organizations permanently located in a foreign country and assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation management functions under section 515 of Title 10 U.S.C. and under Joint Publication 1-02, regardless of the actual name given to such DoD Component. Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security cooperation functions. The term “SCO” does not include units, formations, or other *ad hoc* organizations that conduct security cooperation activities such as mobile training teams, mobile education teams, or operational units conducting security cooperation activities.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Joint Publication 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” April 12, 2001, as amended through April 2010.

<sup>6</sup> Joint Publication 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” April 12, 2001, as amended through April 2010.

<sup>7</sup> DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” October 24, 2008.



## **Observation 1. Contribution of the Partnership Strategy Group-Iraq**

Despite significant challenges, plans for transitioning the OSC-I were sufficiently advanced and operative largely due to initiative taken by the USF-I Partnership Strategy Group-Iraq (PSG-I).

Acting from the “bottom-up,” PSG-I became a driving force behind transitioning OSC-I mission-related authority to DOS and Chief of Mission in Baghdad. At times, PSG-I performed key functions normally accomplished at higher echelons and effectively influenced important higher level DoD and interagency actions at critical points. Without PSG-I’s initiative and effort in developing key aspects of the plan for establishing an OSC at the U.S. Embassy, it was unlikely that the security assistance transition planning would have advanced on a timely basis.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

- **Remarks of President Barack Obama (as prepared for delivery), Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq, February 27, 2009.**
- **American Embassy – Baghdad/Multi-National Force – Iraq 2010 Joint Campaign Plan, November 23, 2009.**
- **Joint Publication 3-33, “Joint Task Force Headquarters,” February 16, 2007.**
- **Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Operation Planning,” December 26, 2006.**

### ***Discussion***

#### **PSG-I Stand-Up**

Though joint military doctrine provided for standing up specialized planning groups in advance, the necessity to establish PSG-I resulted more from a chance confluence of several important factors within USF-I:

- Recognition of an important post-2011 planning gap;
- Initiative by its senior leaders to address that gap; and
- Availability of skilled and experienced personnel who could form the core of PSG-I and direct its security assistance related planning.

The impetus behind PSG-I began when senior USF-I Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training personnel recognized an important planning gap. In 2008, DCG (A&T) was responsible for critical U.S. military activities that would endure into post-transition Iraq, but the Joint Campaign Plan two-year update cycle did not then encompass those aspects. A need to better appreciate those more distant circumstances caused several senior DCG (A&T) officials to advocate for a more strategic, longer-range planning focus than what then existed.

The President’s February 2009 announcement to withdraw all U.S. forces by December 2011 shifted the planning focus. The announcement caused USF-I to focus on force withdrawal and standing down its headquarters by end of mission, December 31, 2011. It also increased the need for someone to look beyond that horizon. That longer-term perspective was needed to determine what types of post-2011 ISF capabilities and U.S. military activities would be required. Such information was critical to informing key senior level DoD decision-makers,

especially regarding longer-range resource decisions like OSC-I manpower and funding. As one DCG (A&T) official reported, an analogy of budget and other longer-range institutional planning cycles “hardening under our feet” especially resonated with senior USF-I leaders and expedited PSG-I’s *ad hoc* standup.

### **Rigorous Thinking – Broad Influence**

By chance, DCG (A&T) already had a few individuals with the collective experience to fulfill the need for rigorous, long-lead planning. That small cadre of experienced strategic and security cooperation planners – PSG-I – was essential to informing senior level DoD decisions. Besides providing senior DoD leaders a more comprehensive idea of what post-2011 would be like, PSG-I efforts improved the chances of success in late 2010 and throughout 2011 for areas such as DoD interactions with DOS and securing OSC-I funding and manpower resources.

PSG-I influenced broader DoD and interagency actions from its inception. For instance, shortly after being established in mid-2009, PSG-I helped formulate USF-I responses to several National Security Council resource queries. PSG-I inputs leveraged their early analysis of future, post-2011 ISF capability requirements. By effectively projecting into the post-2011 timeframe, their analysis helped clarify important details about what future ISF capabilities and U.S. security cooperation activities would be necessary. Their efforts also formed the basis for improved USF-I and higher echelon DoD prioritization and planning, which ultimately assisted in determining the types of equipment the U.S. should transfer to the Iraqis during the drawdown to best bolster ISF capability. PSG-I brought similar rigor to interagency and DoD discussions on OSC-I size options and, eventually, to security assistance transition planning.

PSG-I was central to developing the detailed OSC-I transition plan. To offset an early shortage of higher DoD level OSC-I related policy and theater security cooperation guidance, PSG-I researched and consolidated numerous authoritative sources and references on their own. In dealing with considerable uncertainty, they effectively framed the planning situation by making reasonable assumptions and, thereafter, ensured the execution concept was sufficiently flexible and robust to accommodate remaining unknowns. That concept maximized freedom of action by essentially adopting a “worse case” scenario with a broad range of options for execution.

### **Comprehensive Case Study Warranted**

PSG-I should have been established even earlier than it was to more fully leverage DoD’s established strategic planning cycles. Instead of springing from the initiative of a few senior USF-I personnel, it should have been more broadly driven by the DoD institutional hierarchy.

PSG-I’s performance may have reflected a high-level DoD response to the difficulties of coping with considerable strategic uncertainty. As higher echelons of authority within OSD and USCENTCOM discovered a subordinate level entity that had the requisite competency to perform certain functions, they readily deferred performance of those functions down to that lower echelon. In doing so, however, it became apparent that PSG-I frequently did not possess adequate authority or control of resources to effectively accomplish those tasks.

In that regard, the PSG-I experience may have reflected lessons learned documented in other joint situations involving tactical level groups being empowered to think and act in a more

strategic manner to accomplish complicated, time-compressed planning and decision actions. Those aspects, while outside the scope of this project, need to be explored in more detail and warrant a comprehensive case study by USCENTCOM.

## **Conclusion**

Given PSG-I's importance to the OSC-I transition and other critical planning efforts in Iraq, the chance occurrence of its initial stand up had considerable consequence. Its performance was noteworthy in that with considerable discipline and rigor, a small team was able to perform key functions normally accomplished at higher echelons. PSG-I also influenced broader drawdown and transition efforts even before being tasked to perform the detailed OSC-I transition planning.

PSG-I promoted necessary actions at higher DoD echelons and key interagency levels at critical times, to include OSC-I option deliberations. DoD's institutional hierarchy did not anticipate the need for a capability such as that of PSG-I. Rather, the actions of a few individuals resulted in a field command taking exceptional planning initiative that advanced broader efforts and provided a sufficiently detailed transition plan within compressed timelines. Without PSG-I initiative and effort, it was unlikely OSC-I related transition planning would have advanced on a timely basis.

Beyond our observations, there may exist a number of other key "lessons learned" resulting from the PSG-I experience. Regardless, the effective role PSG-I has played indicates it may provide a model for future complicated contingency transition planning. It is important to ensure that the circumstances of the PSG-I experience are captured to support addressing those future operational contingency transition challenges.

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

- 1.a. Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination with Joint Staff J7 and J5, and Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, direct a "case study" that captures the Partnership Strategy Group-Iraq role in developing the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq Transition Plan as a potential model for use in Afghanistan and other future complex contingency operations.

### ***Management Comments***

USCENTCOM non-concurred with the recommendation. Detailed comments received from USCENTCOM are included in the classified annex to this report that is available upon request.

### ***Our Response***

USCENTCOM comments were non responsive. Our detailed response is included in the classified annex; however, we acknowledge that the decision to conduct a case study that captures the lessons learned in Iraq regarding the role of PSG-I in developing the OSC-I transition plan is a command prerogative that we will not challenge. Accordingly, no further response to this recommendation is required.

1.b. Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, in coordination with Joint Staff J7, prepare and submit a joint lessons learned report that assesses the utility of a strategic planning group, like Partnership Strategy Group-Iraq, in facilitating complex contingency transition planning.

### ***Management Comments***

USF-I concurred with the recommendation to submit joint lessons learned. USF-I stated they will work with Joint Staff/J7 Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) during the August 2011 and January 2012 visits to study the transition and develop joint lessons learned. JCOA expects to publish their findings in mid 2012. Additionally, The RAND Corporation and the Center for Lessons Learned are conducting transition studies in 2011 and 2012 to capture lessons, challenges, and best practices in Iraq.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I's comments were partially responsive. As USF-I will be disestablished by 2012, we request that USCENTCOM provide copies of the JCOA and RAND studies when these reports are completed.

## **Observation 2. Timeliness of Theater Security Cooperation Guidance**

Less than a year before the U.S. force withdrawal deadline and within months of a major OSC-I transition milestone, USCENTCOM had still not issued updated Theater Campaign Plan, Theater Security Cooperation, and Iraq Country Plan details.

Delayed issuance of updated theater security cooperation related guidance was due to prolonged efforts by USCENTCOM to comply with strategic DoD directives that they integrate Theater Security Cooperation Plan details into their Theater Campaign Plan. Other contributing factors included a short notice change of USCENTCOM Commanders, turnover of several U.S. senior leaders in Iraq, reluctance of the USCENTCOM staff to interfere in USF-I matters, and an apparent shortage of USCENTCOM security cooperation staff dedicated to supporting the OSC-I transition.

This situation required USF-I to “lead from the bottom,” but with uncertain results. USF-I formed PSG-I in early 2009. PSG-I then performed functions normally carried out at higher echelons to develop a sufficient OSC-I transition plan. However, because USF-I was mainly oriented on Iraq, rather than broader theater or national level aspects, it was unclear how well those efforts supported attaining national level goals and end states, especially when intermediate level theater-wide security cooperation related details remained less specified.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

- **DoD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.**
- **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01A, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures),” September 29, 2006.**
- **Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Operation Planning,” December 26, 2006.**
- **USCENTCOM Iraq Transition Plan, December 1, 2010.**
- **USF-I OPORD 11-01, January 6, 2011.**

### ***Discussion***

#### **Delayed Theater Level Security Cooperation Guidance**

Responding to Joint Staff orders, USCENTCOM deferred detailed transition planning to USF-I but retained responsibility for broader theater-wide security cooperation planning aspects. USCENTCOM subsequently delayed issuing updated theater campaign and security cooperation plans, to include Iraq Country Plan details. USCENTCOM did issue an updated Theater Campaign Plan in late March 2011 but, as of April 2011, did not intend to further issue Iraq Country Plan details until mid-2011 at the earliest.

Delays appeared to at least partly stem from prolonged USCENTCOM efforts to comply with senior level DoD strategic capabilities and force employment guidance.<sup>8</sup> In 2008, DoD guidance directed USCENTCOM to integrate Theater Security Cooperation Plan aspects into their Theater Campaign Plan. That was a new approach and has reportedly been a challenge. Besides the updated Theater Campaign Plan, there was no evidence of USCENTCOM issuing more detailed interim security cooperation guidance for Iraq.

Senior leader turnover caused further delays. At one point, USCENTCOM officials indicated they were preparing a strategic policy paper on Iraq that would be issued by June 2010. When that date slipped to Fall 2011, USCENTCOM officials stated it was due to an unscheduled change of their commander and adjusted priorities. In another instance, USF-I planners mentioned a need to develop an integrated “bridging” plan with USCENTCOM but deferred those efforts due to the then projected turnover of USF-I Commanders in late 2010.

### **Implications for Executing the OSC-I Transition**

USF-I created PSG-I to deal with an early shortage of theater-wide security cooperation guidance. PSG-I enabled USF-I to overcome early gaps in guidance and effectively “lead from the bottom.” Though noteworthy, those efforts had shortcomings.

Lack of current planning information was one concern. Specifically, current USCENTCOM theater strategy and the Theater Security Cooperation Plan are dated 2008. The most recent USF-I OSC-I plan update occurred prior to OSD issuing its latest 2010 theater specific security cooperation guidance. Notably, USCENTCOM officials reported their 2010-related guidance would differ substantially from that of 2008. Dated planning information could skew OSC-I mission focus, impede the transition, and increase risks, especially when combined with other factors.

Though PSG-I was mainly focused on Iraq, and not on broader theater or national level circumstances, PSG-I personnel had to develop their own appreciation of theater and national level dynamics. But in some regards that perception was based on dated higher echelon planning sources. The combination of deriving a broader appreciation of theater and national level circumstances while at least partially relying on dated higher echelon information raised questions about how well those efforts aligned with theater and higher level perspectives. This especially concerned some senior DoD officials.

USCENTCOM was slow to engage in OSC-I efforts for several reasons. First, USCENTCOM should not have initially deferred as much detailed OSC-I transition planning responsibility to USF-I as it did. Enduring OSC-I activities more closely align with USCENTCOM perspectives and planning horizon timelines than to those of USF-I, which will disband and terminate its mission. Next, USF-I is focused on Iraq, with little visibility into how activities there relate to the broader regional security cooperation equation. Evidence also indicated that the USCENTCOM staff was reluctant to aggressively engage in another four-star command’s (USF-I) affairs to ensure their perspectives were being included, even if that four-star command

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<sup>8</sup> Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for issuing theater specific security cooperation instructions within its Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) directive that routinely follows a 2-year strategic update cycle.

was subordinate. Finally, USCENTCOM needed greater numbers of more experienced personnel working Iraq security cooperation related issues, as indications suggested that their existing OSC-I support capability and capacity were already being strained.

## **Conclusion**

Although PSG-I effectively enabled USF-I to overcome significant planning shortcomings, their work was based on dated sources and a view that was oriented on Iraq, rather than broader U.S. theater or national level circumstances. Questionable results could have arisen due to uncertainty about how well USF-I efforts supported attaining national level goals and end states when the intermediate, theater level security cooperation context was less specified and details for Iraq remained unresolved.

The window of opportunity to impact the critical OSC-I transition period is closing rapidly. While related USCENTCOM plans will not be issued until mid-2011, there is time to provide interim security cooperation guidance for Iraq. Guidance provided even a few months earlier could help to better focus OSC-I transition activities toward achieving higher level U.S. goals and objectives. This reality requires USCENTCOM to fully resource its efforts to establish a fully functioning OSC-I, to include ensuring sufficient security cooperation related manpower is on hand to support the critical transition period that extends at least through the end of 2011.

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

2.a. Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq and as a matter of priority, issue interim theater level campaign, security cooperation, and Iraq specific country planning guidance sufficient to effectively focus and enable efforts of a robust Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq through the 2012 time period.

### ***Management Comments***

USCENTCOM non-concurred with the recommendation. Detailed comments received from USCENTCOM are included in the classified annex that is available upon request.

### ***Our Response***

USCENTCOM comments were partially responsive. Our response is included in the classified annex.

2.b. Commander, U.S. Central Command, assess sufficiency of internal procedures and resources dedicated to providing Iraq-specific security cooperation related planning and guidance and for establishing a robust Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq.

### ***Management Comments***

USCENTCOM concurred with comment to the recommendation. Detailed comments received from USCENTCOM are included in the classified annex that is available upon request.

### ***Our Response***

USCENTCOM comments were partially responsive. Our response is included in the classified annex.

### **Observation 3. Sufficiency of Joint Doctrine**

Joint doctrine, as constituted at the time of this assessment, insufficiently supported transitioning from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities within a non-permissive security environment, as was occurring in Iraq.

The need for more explicit guidance was not immediately evident to the authors of key joint doctrine publications. The principal joint planning doctrine (Joint Publication 5-0) mainly deals with rapidly building up and transitioning the military to a higher force employment status in response to a crisis; guidance for drawing down forces and transitioning to robust security cooperation activities in a non-permissive security environment<sup>9</sup> was not as clear. Joint doctrine, in general, contained few details explicit to the broader transition that was occurring in Iraq from the 2010 through 2011 time period or to the more specific OSC-I situation.

Unless lessons even broadly related to the OSC-I transition from across DoD are more formally recorded and further codified to provide amplified detail in joint doctrine, it is unlikely solutions or results similar to what occurred in Iraq would automatically emerge in future operations.

#### ***Applicable Criteria***

- **DoD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.**
- **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01A, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures),” September 29, 2006.**
- **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25D, “Joint Lessons Learned Program,” October 10, 2008.**
- **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02B, “Joint Doctrine Development Process,” December 4, 2009.**
- **Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Operation Planning,” December 26, 2006.**

#### ***Discussion***

##### **Sufficiency of Joint Planning Doctrine**

Broadly stated, the purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the effectiveness of U.S. forces by influencing training, leader development, and other force development aspects. Attending to those aspects is fundamental to ensuring that generating force capabilities match operating requirements.

Officials from across DoD engaged in the OSC-I standup efforts stated that joint doctrine did not effectively support the transition they were involved with in Iraq. Senior USF-I OSC-I transition planners indicated that joint doctrine did not provide sufficiently detailed guidance about what

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<sup>9</sup> Joint Publication 1-02 defines permissive environment as: “Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.” This report uses this definition to explain a non-permissive environment as one in which some level of lawlessness or heightened risk is assumed due to a breakdown in host country military and law enforcement capability.

was needed to transition from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities within a non-permissive environment. Virtually every DoD military and civilian official interviewed involved in OSC-I related transition efforts, regardless of activity, voiced similar views.

## **Long Lead Items and Planning Cycles**

Unlike drawing down forces, establishing the OSC-I involved long-lead programming actions to stand up a critical new mission capability. USF-I was mainly focused on withdrawing forces in Iraq by end-of-mission, December 2011. USF-I's OSC-I transition planners and other DoD supporting efforts needed to secure resources and authority for conducting the more enduring OSC-I missions. Though PSG-I adapted doctrinally sound planning methodology to its longer-range planning efforts with good effect, some critical OSC-I actions were still delayed. Recognizing that delays often stemmed from a lack of interagency doctrine, we focused mainly on identifying DoD shortfalls.

We detected DoD-related training and leader development shortfalls. DoD operational planners were generally unfamiliar with aspects critical to standing up an Office of Security Cooperation. Prior to August 2010, for instance, broader USF-I campaign plans did not explicitly address completing long-range tasks critical to establishing the OSC-I. Besides contributing to DoD missing opportunities to leverage its existing strategic planning cycles, the lack of consideration for long lead tasks suggested a need for improved joint operation planner training. DoD personnel also needed better training on how to assist the Iraqi security ministries to develop their strategic planning processes. Codifying those details in joint doctrine is an effective way of addressing such force development shortfalls.

## **Factors Contributing to the Doctrine Gap**

Doctrine, by definition, is limited to wisdom about actual capabilities and best practices, but for that wisdom to be incorporated it must first make its way into the joint doctrine development process. As lead agent for joint doctrine development, Joint Staff J7 is responsible for consolidation, review, and adjudication overview of inputs from many DoD sources for incorporation into joint doctrine. Such inputs normally take the form of lessons learned reports, study findings, or other formally recorded insights from the operational community and practitioners.

It appears likely that the approaches and best practices emanating from the OSC-I planner efforts were not reported through these more traditional input channels. For instance, interviews with the authors of Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, now nearing completion of a two-year revision effort, demonstrated little knowledge of the lessons that OSC-I planners had learned. Other DoD officials reporting on efforts to create a new joint doctrinal manual on Stability Operations also showed little understanding of the OSC-I planner experiences. The joint publication authors we interviewed specified that they were not considering any inputs even broadly related to the OSC-I transition for incorporation into their then ongoing updates.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Joint Publications reviewed (with their status at the time of our interview) included: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (under review); JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (under review; JP 3-07, Joint Stability and Support Operations (under development and unpublished); and, JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations (under review).

Extant joint doctrine appeared to bracket the issues raised in this report. At the broadest level, JP 3-0 introduced and defined “security cooperation activities” and JP 5-0 further detailed the fundamentals of joint operation planning. But JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, mainly detailed those actions required to rapidly build up the military and transition it to a higher force employment status in response to an unfolding crisis. Details for transitioning from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities were not as developed. Authors of several joint doctrine publications cited references that touched on transitions, but only in the broadest sense and did not provide significant added detail. Several manuals subordinate to JP 3-0 detailed some aspects relevant to the issue; specifically, JP 3-22 described “security cooperation” in the context of Foreign Internal Defense and a new joint doctrine manual under development (JP 3-07) detailed joint doctrine for stability operations. Together, these disparate treatments still provided little detailed guidance for transitioning from combat or stability operations to robust security cooperation activities and are not, *in toto*, holistic doctrinal treatment to the specific gap identified in this report. The imperative therefore is to harvest and consolidate hard-learned insights that more comprehensively address identified transition related challenges in order to affect joint doctrine going forward.

It is important to ensure that lessons learned in OSC-I planning during 2009-2011 be incorporated into joint doctrine. CJCSI 5120.02 offers a path to follow in this regard. Beyond the likely probability that lessons and insights were not inputted through traditional channels, it is also possible that processes for determining which inputs would be incorporated in the updates ongoing at that time may also have limitations. Regardless, reasons for these likely causes warrant further attention. One suggestion may be to treat highly developed joint findings differently, as senior DoD leaders did in 2004 for a series of Iraq-related lessons learned findings developed by U.S. Joint Forces Command. In that instance, developed findings were largely incorporated unless compelling opposing evidence was presented.

Though a different situation and context, JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, illustrates the type of details DoD OSC-I transition practitioners indicated that they needed and may offer a template for the detail necessary to treat the identified transition topic in this report. Specifically, the JP 4-05 demobilization section addressed several resourcing requirements: material / equipment, manpower, transportation, facilities, training, host-nation support, legal authorities, and funding. An appendix in JP 4-05 provided other expanded details about legal authorities. Similar types of resource and authority guidance would have been useful to DoD OSC-I transition efforts, had it been provided in a more appropriate context.

## **Conclusion**

Joint doctrine needs to provide expanded planning consideration details related to transitioning from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities. Joint planning doctrine focused mainly on a rapid military build-up and transition to higher intensity operations; transitioning from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities, such as the context in Iraq, was not as clearly developed. Joint doctrine otherwise generally afforded this type of transition disparate treatment.

Updated doctrine is vital to ensuring effective warfighter support emerges more automatically in future operations. Expanded transition-related doctrine would more comprehensively influence

force development efforts, like training and leader development, to ensure that generating force capabilities better match operating force requirements. In the case of transitioning from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities, as was the context of the OSC-I transition in Iraq, important joint doctrine gaps existed that needed to be addressed. Steps must be taken to capture the detailed knowledge gained by OSC-I planners and incorporate it into joint doctrine.

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

***Revised Recommendations.*** As a result of comments received to draft Recommendation 3.a. and 3.b., and based on conversations with the Joint Staff, Chief, Joint Education and Doctrine Division (JS/J7), we have revised the recommendations as follows.

3.a. Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, and Director, Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J7:

(1) Sponsor a study that explicitly covers the planning for transitioning from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities in a non-permissive environment in Iraq from early 2009 through 2011 sufficient to develop and sponsor a formal doctrine proposal. Study requirements may be alternately satisfied by combining with Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command Iraq Transition Plan study proposal – dated March 23, 2011, and U.S. Central Command response of June 9, 2011 – or other related study efforts.

(2) Assess sufficiency of current U.S. Central Command joint lessons learned processes and assigned resources to ensure observations and insights emerging from ongoing contingency operations are managed in accordance with the Joint Lessons Learned Information Program, to include formal submission for inclusion into joint doctrine.

(3) Review and recommend changes to appropriate joint doctrine publications to ensure they effectively reflect the doctrinal aspects of planning and conducting transitions from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities in a non-permissive environment.

3.b. Director, Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J7, in accordance with CJCSI 5120.02B, and in coordination with Commander, U.S. Central Command, and Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, assess the sufficiency of joint doctrine with respect to its consistency with Department of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff policy regarding effective conduct of stability operations, to include details related to transitioning to robust security cooperation activities in complex operational contingencies.

### ***Management Comments***

The Chief, Joint Education and Doctrine Division (JS/J7) partially concurred with the draft recommendations. The JS/J7 comments essentially concurred with the observation and major points in the report but non-concurred with the solution we recommended. They indicated that joint doctrine is founded upon the collective wisdom of practitioners as accumulated and reflected over time by operational lessons learned, studies, reports, and other authoritative

sources. Given that the transition was a relatively recent occurrence, and in accordance with CJCSI 3150.25D, JS/J7 cited USCENTCOM as having the primary responsibility to ensure that relevant lessons learned from ongoing contingency operations in their area of operations were submitted to the Joint Lessons Learned Program for incorporation into joint doctrine.

## ***Our Response***

The Chief, Joint Education and Doctrine Division (JS/J7) comments were responsive. Despite their non-concurrence, and based on our conversations with their office after publication of the draft report, and after a review of CJCSI 5120.02, we have revised the recommendations in this final report. We recognize the responsibility of the COCOMs to accurately capture lessons learned and to submit recommendations for changes to joint doctrine. For this reason, we have addressed Recommendation 3.a.(1) through 3.a.(3) to USCENTCOM as a matter for COCOM attention. We have included Recommendation 3.b. as a matter for JS/J7 lead, per CJCSI 5120.02, to assess the sufficiency of joint doctrine's consistency with DoD and CJCS stability operations policy, especially details related to transitioning to robust security cooperation activities in complex operational contingencies. We request that USCENTCOM and Chief, Joint Education and Doctrine Division (JS/J7) provide their comments to these recommendations in response to the final report.



# Appendix A. Scope, Methodology, and Acronyms

We conducted this assessment from January 3, 2010, to March 31, 2011, in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspections*. We planned and performed the assessment to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our observations, conclusions, and recommendations, based on our objectives. We conducted site visits to Iraq from June 2, 2010, to June 20, 2010.

We reviewed Federal Laws and regulations, including the National Defense Authorization Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, the Security Assistance Manual, and appropriate DoD, USCENTCOM, and USF-I guidance.

The scope of our assessment in Iraq was to determine whether U.S. Government goals, objectives, plans, and guidance are issued and operative for the transition of the Iraqi Security Assistance Mission (previously a component of MNSTC-I, now of USF-I) from DoD authority to an Office of Security Cooperation under DOS authority, and; whether ongoing U.S. forces' efforts to provide security assistance to the Government of Iraq are adversely impacted by the drawdown plans of USF-I and the implementation of those plans.

We visited or contacted organizations in the U.S., the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, and in Iraq that are responsible for training, planning, and implementing the security assistance and security cooperation activities in Iraq. We spoke with U.S. and Iraqi leaders and managers at various levels, ranging from general officers to staff officers to senior Embassy personnel who are involved in the security assistance and security cooperation mission in Iraq.

## Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not utilize any computer-processed data in this assessment.

## Acronyms Used in this Report

The following is a list of the acronyms used in this report.

DCG (A&T)	Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOS	U.S. Department of State
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
GoI	Government of Iraq
ISAM	Iraq Security Assistance Mission
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ITAM	Iraq Training Assistance Mission
JCOA	Joint Center for Operational Analysis
JCP	Joint Campaign Plan
JP	Joint Publication
MNF-I	Multi-National Forces – Iraq

MNSTC-I	Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq
OPORD	Operation Order
OSC	Office of Security Cooperation
OSC-I	Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PSG-I	Partnership Strategy Group – Iraq
SCO	Security Cooperation Organization
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USD(P)	Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
USF-I	U.S. Forces – Iraq

## **Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage**

During the last three years, the Government Accountability Office and the Department of State Inspector General have issued reports discussing topics related to security assistance or the transition of the security assistance mission to the State Department. This is the DoD OIG's first report relevant to this subject.

Unrestricted Government Accountability Office reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>. Some of the prior coverage we examined in preparing this report included:

### **Congressionally Initiated Reports**

Iraq: The Transition From a Military Mission to a Civilian-Led Effort, A Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, January 31, 2011.

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan and Iraq, "Special Report on Iraq Transition Planning," July, 2010.

### **GAO**

GAO-09-294SP, "Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," March 2009.

GAO-09-0454, "Defense Exports: Foreign Military Sales Program Needs Better Controls for Exported Items and Information for Oversight," May 2009.

GAO-07-308SP, "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," January 2007.

### **Department of State Inspector General**

United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Report of Inspection: Compliance Follow-up Review of Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, Report Number ISP-C-11-08A, October 2010.

MERO-A-09-10, Middle East Regional Office, "Performance Audit of Embassy Baghdad's Transition Planning for a Reduced United States Military Presence in Iraq," August 2009.



# Appendix C. Organizations Contacted or Visited

We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with officials (or former officials) from the following U.S., NATO, and Iraqi organizations:

## Government of the United States

### *Department of State*

#### **Washington, D.C.**

- Office of the Inspector General

#### **U.S. Embassy - Cairo**

- Economic Political Affairs Advisor
- Regional Security Advisor
- Management Affairs

#### **U.S. Embassy - Baghdad**

- Political Military Advisor
- Regional Security Officer
- Management Affairs
- International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
- Iraqi National Security Council Advisor

### *Department of Defense*

#### **Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)**

- Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) – Mid-East Directorate
- OSD – Cost Assessment and Policy Evaluation

#### **Joint Staff**

- Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5)
- Director, Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J7)

#### **U.S. Central Command**

- Headquarters
  - CCJ3 – Operations Directorate
  - CCJ4 – Logistics Directorate
  - CCJ5 – Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate
- Saudi Arabia
  - U.S. Military Training Mission – Saudi Arabia
  - Office of the Program Manager – Saudi Arabian National Guard
  - Office of the Program Manager – Facility Security Forces

- Defense Attaché – Saudi Arabia
- Egypt
  - Office of Military Cooperation – Egypt
  - AH-64 Apache, Train and Assist Field Team – Abu Hammad
- U.S. Forces – Iraq
  - Chief of Staff
  - J1 (Personnel)
  - J3 (Operations)
  - J5 (Plans)
  - J8 (Finance)
  - J9 (Strategic Communications)
  - Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training (DCG (A-T))
    - Executive Director
    - PSG-I
    - Iraq Security Assistance Mission (ISAM) Director
    - ISAM Army
    - ISAM Navy
    - ISAM Air Force
    - ISAM Train and Education
    - ISAM Logistics
    - ISAM End Use Monitoring
    - ISAM Logistics
    - ISAM Infrastructure
    - Iraq Train and Assist Mission (ITAM) Ministry of Defense
    - ITAM Ministry of Interior
    - ITAM Army
    - ITAM Navy
    - ITAM Air Force
    - ITAM Intel
    - ITAM Police
  - Deputy Commanding General for Sustainment

## **Defense Agencies**

- Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

## **NATO**

- Chief of Staff NATO Training Mission – Iraq

## **Government of Iraq**

### ***Ministry of Defense***

- Director General Acquisition and Sustainment

## **Joint Headquarters**

- Vice Chief of Staff



# **Appendix D. U.S. Policy and Plans, and DoD Policy and Guidance**

## **Part I – U.S. Policy and Plans**

### **Remarks of President Barack Obama (as prepared for delivery), Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq, February 27, 2009.**

President's speech at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, outlined the strategy and phased approach for the responsible drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and development of an enduring strategic partnership with Iraq.

### **National Security Presidential Directive 36. “United States Government Operations in Iraq.” May 11, 2004. (NSPD-36)**

This directive grants to Commander, USCENTCOM, the authority to direct all United States Government efforts in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces. NSPD-36 also states that “at the appropriate time, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly decide when these functions shall transfer to a security assistance organization and other appropriate organizations under the authority of the Secretary of State and the Chief of Mission that will be staffed in accordance with NSDD-38 of June 2, 1982.”

### **National Security Decision Directive 38, “Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and Their Overseas Constituent Posts,” June 2, 1982. (NSDD-38)**

This directive describes the requirement to seek the Chief of Mission's approval prior to making any change in the size, composition or mandate of any staff element that falls under the Chief of Mission.

### **American Embassy – Baghdad/Multinational Force – Iraq 2010 Joint Campaign Plan, November 23, 2009.**

This joint document describes the broad means by which the United States Government will implement its evolving mission and presence in Iraq in compliance with the President's vision for establishing an “enduring strategic partnership between the United States and a sovereign stable, self-reliant Iraq.” Annex F of the Joint Campaign Plan describes “Transition” activities to be accomplished through December 31, 2011, including the task of standing up an Office of Security Cooperation by the summer of 2011, manned by 100-300 OSC personnel (mainly military personnel assigned to Iraq under Chief of Mission authority.)

## **Part II – DoD Policy and Guidance**

### **DoD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.**

This instruction provides guidance on stability operations. This guidance will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned aid in further development of DoD policy and assignment of responsibility for the identification and development of DoD capabilities to support stability operations.

**DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” October 24, 2008.**

Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities under the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Guidance for the Development of the Force, and titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code, and statutory authorities, Executive orders, and policies relating to the administration of security cooperation, including security assistance.

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01A, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures),” September 29, 2006.**

This manual sets forth planning policies, processes, and procedures to govern the joint operation planning and execution activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commander(s) and other joint force commanders in development of selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. Enclosure (R) of the manual describes the responsibilities and procedures for completing a Request for Forces or Request for Capabilities message.

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25D, “Joint Lessons Learned Program,” October 10, 2008.**

This instruction establishes policy, guidance, and responsibilities for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Lessons Learned Program and codifies the Joint Lessons Learned Information System as the DoD system of record for the Joint Lessons Learned Program.

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02B, “Joint Doctrine Development Process,” December 4, 2009.**

This instruction sets forth policy and provides detailed procedures to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in implementing the responsibility to develop and establish doctrine for all aspects of the joint employment of the Armed Forces.

**Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 30 September 2010).**

This publication sets forth standard U.S. military and associated terminology to encompass the joint activity of the Armed Forces of the United States in both U.S. joint and allied joint operations, as well as to encompass the DoD as a whole.

**Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations,” 17 September 2006, Incorporating Change 2, March 22, 2010.**

This publication reflects the current guidance for conducting joint and multinational activities across the range of military operations. Often called the “linchpin” of the joint doctrine publication hierarchy, the overarching constructs and principles contained in this publication provide a common perspective from which to plan and execute joint operations in cooperation with our multinational partners, other U.S. Government agencies, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.

**Joint Publication 3-08, “Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I,” March 17, 2006.**

This publication sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for U.S. military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. But it does not restrict the authority of the joint force commander from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner deemed most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. This volume specifically covers the interagency, intergovernmental organization, and nongovernmental organization environment and provides fundamental principles and guidance to facilitate coordination between the Department of Defense, and other U.S. Government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and regional organizations.

**Joint Publication 3-33, “Joint Task Force Headquarters,” February 16, 2007.**

This publication provides joint doctrine for the formation and employment of a joint task force headquarters to command and control joint operations. It provides guidance on the joint task force headquarters role in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing joint task force operations.

**Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Operational Planning,” December 26, 2006.**

This document sets forth joint doctrine to govern the joint operation planning activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, providing joint doctrinal basis for U.S. military coordination with other agencies and for U.S. military involvement in multinational operations across the full range of military operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders; incorporates all Adaptive Planning initiatives currently approved for implementation; complements Adaptive Planning processes and procedures defined in the latest version of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01A; and highlights the joint operation planning process as a complement to the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

**USCENTCOM Iraq Transition Plan, December 1, 2010.**

This document was classified and outlined USCENTCOM support to the U.S. whole of government approach to the transition in Iraq. Its goal was to coordinate the transition of tasks that USCENTCOM will assume from USF-I, successfully establish and posture the OSC-I, and fully support the Department of State as lead agency.

**USF-I OPORD 10-01, effective 1 January 2010.**

This document was classified and provided guidance for all U.S. forces in Iraq in accordance with the security agreement, from 1 Jan 10 until end of mission. It identified the objectives that U.S. forces would accomplish in order to achieve the end state in the commander’s intent.

**USF-I FRAGO 10-01.3, Transition to Stability Operations, to USF-I OPORD 10-01, February 15, 2010.**

This document was classified and directed staff and supporting command actions for transition to stability operations in Iraq. Contents included situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and signal details for the designated period.

**USF-I FRAGO 1260, Transition PLANORD Directive, to USF-I OPORD 10-01, May 18, 2010.**

This document was classified and directed the staff and designated commands to develop plans for the transition of enduring major U.S. Government activities from USF-I to appropriate agencies in support of USF-I OPORD 10-01. Besides listing required transition plans with assigned staff sections, it also included objectives and specified enduring activities directed for inclusion in the required plans.

**USF-I OPORD 11-01, effective January 6, 2011.**

This document was classified and provided guidance to coordinate the transition of tasks that Headquarters, USCENTCOM will assume from USF-I; to establish and posture the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq; and to fully support the Department of State as lead agency in Iraq in order to establish a traditional bilateral security relationship with Iraq.

# Appendix E. Management Comments

## Joint Staff/J7 - Joint Force Development Comments



**THE JOINT STAFF**  
WASHINGTON, DC


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20318-7000

1 JUL 11

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR  
SPECIAL PLANS & OPERATIONS**

**Subject: Assessment of Planning for Transitioning the Security Assistance Mission  
in Iraq from Department of Defense to Department of State Authority**

1. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General's draft report "Assessment of Planning for Transitioning the Security Assistance Mission in Iraq from Department of Defense to Department of State Authority." Transitioning from Phase IV "stabilize" to Phase V "enable civil authority" operations is an emerging and relevant field that continues to be analyzed.
2. While I broadly agree with most of the report, I non-concur with the report's "Observation 3 - Sufficiency of Joint Doctrine" recommendations as well as selected paragraphs and text. As a result, and in consultation with the authors of the report, I clarified and refined the issues which are enclosed for your consideration. I anticipate these changes will facilitate a more productive dialogue with our partners in the US government and beyond.
3. The Joint Staff/J7 Action Officer is [REDACTED]

  
JEROME M. LYNES  
Chief, Joint Education and  
Doctrine Division

Enclosures:

- 1- Joint Staff J7 response to DOD/IG report
- 2- USJFCOM letter, 23 MAR 11
- 3- USF-I letter, 29 MAY 11
- 4- USCENTCOM letter, 9 JUN 11

# Joint Staff/J7 - Joint Force Development Comments

## ENCLOSURE 1

JOINT STAFF J7 COMMENTS to the "Department of Defense Office of Inspector General Report:

- RECOMMENDATION 3. U.S. Central Command review and recommend changes to JP 5-0, JP 3-07, JP 3-0 and JP 3-22 as appropriate to capture the doctrinal aspects of planning and conducting a transition from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities in a non-permissive environment. (Reference: CJCSI 5120.02.)
- RECOMMENDATION 4. In relation to US Central Command's response to cooperate with US Joint Forces Command's Iraq Transition Plan study dated 9 JUN 11, US Central Command should ensure that observations (doctrinal or otherwise) related to the transition from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities in a non-permissive environment are managed in accordance with the Joint Lessons Learned Information program. (Reference: CJCSI 3150.25D).
- PARAGRAPH/TEXT - Observation 3. Sufficiency of Joint Doctrine

Joint doctrine, as constituted at the time of this assessment, insufficiently supported transitioning from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities within a non-permissive security environment, as was occurring in Iraq.

The need for more explicit guidance was not immediately evident to the authors of key joint doctrine publications. The principal joint planning doctrine (Joint Publication 5-0) mainly deals with rapidly building up and transitioning the military to a higher force employment status in response to a crisis; guidance for drawing down forces and transitioning to robust security cooperation activities in a non-permissive security environment was not as clear. Joint doctrine, in general, contained few details explicitly relating to the broader transition that was occurring in Iraq from the 2010 through 2011 time period or to the more specific OSC-I situation.

Unless lessons even broadly related to the OSC-I transition from across DoD are more formally recorded and further codified in joint doctrine, it is unlikely solutions or results similar to what occurred in Iraq would automatically emerge in future operations.

### Discussion

**Sufficiency of Joint Planning Doctrine** - Broadly stated, the purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the effectiveness of U.S. forces by influencing training, leader development, and other force development aspects. Attending to those

# Joint Staff/J7 - Joint Force Development Comments

aspects is fundamental to ensuring that generating force capabilities match operating requirements.

Officials from across DoD engaged in the OSC-I standup efforts stated that joint doctrine did not effectively support the transition they were involved with in Iraq. Senior USF-I OSC-I transition planners indicated that joint doctrine did not provide sufficiently detailed guidance about what was needed to transition from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities within a non-permissive environment. Virtually every DoD military and civilian official interviewed involved in OSC-I related transition efforts, regardless of activity, voiced similar views.

**Long Lead Items and Planning Cycles** - Unlike drawing down forces, establishing the OSC-I involved long-lead programming actions to stand up a critical new mission capability. USF-I was mainly focused on withdrawing forces in Iraq by end-of-mission, December 2011. USF-I's OSC-I transition planners and other DoD supporting efforts needed to secure resources and authority for conducting the more enduring OSC-I missions. Though PSG-I adapted doctrinally sound planning methodology to its longer-range planning efforts with good effect, some critical OSC-I actions were still delayed. Recognizing that delays often stemmed from a lack of interagency doctrine, we focused mainly on identifying DoD shortfalls.

We detected DoD-related training and leader development shortfalls. DoD operational planners were generally unfamiliar with aspects critical to standing up an Office of Security Cooperation. Prior to August 2010, for instance, broader USF-I campaign plans did not explicitly address completing long-range tasks critical to establishing the OSC-I. Besides contributing to DoD missing opportunities to leverage its existing strategic planning cycles, the lack of consideration for long lead tasks suggested a need for improved joint operation planner training. DoD personnel also needed better training on how to assist the Iraqi security ministries to develop their strategic planning processes. Codifying those details in joint doctrine is an effective way of addressing such force development shortfalls.

**Factors Contributing to the Doctrine Gap** - Doctrine, by definition, is limited to wisdom about actual capabilities and best practices, but for that wisdom to be incorporated it must first make its way into the joint doctrine development process. As the lead agent for joint doctrine development system, Joint Staff J7 is responsible for consolidation, review, and adjudication overview of inputs from many DoD sources for incorporation into joint doctrine. Such inputs normally take the form of lessons learned reports, study findings, or other formally recorded insights from the operational community and practitioners.

It appears likely that the approaches and best practices emanating from the OSC-I planner efforts were not reported through these more traditional input

# Joint Staff/J7 - Joint Force Development Comments

channels. For instance, interviews with the authors of Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, now nearing completion of a two-year revision effort, demonstrated little knowledge of the lessons that OSC-I planners had learned. Other DoD officials reporting on efforts to create a new joint doctrinal manual on Stability Operations also showed little understanding of the OSC-I planner experiences. The joint publication authors we interviewed specified that they were not considering any inputs even broadly related to the OSC-I transition for incorporation into their then ongoing updates.

Extant joint doctrine appeared to bracket the issues raised in this report. At the broadest level, JP 3-0 introduced and defined "security cooperation activities" and JP 5-0 further detailed the fundamentals of joint operation planning. But JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, mainly detailed those actions required to rapidly build up the military and transition it to a higher force employment status in response to an unfolding crisis. Details for transitioning from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities were not as developed. Authors of several joint doctrine publications cited references that touched on transitions, but only in the broadest sense without providing significant added detail. Several joint doctrine publications subordinate to JP 3-0 detailed some aspects relevant to the issue; specifically, JP 3-22 described "security cooperation" in the context of Foreign Internal Defense and a new joint doctrine manual under development (JP 3-07) detailed joint doctrine for stability operations. Together, these disparate treatments still provided little detailed guidance for transitioning from combat or stability operations to robust security cooperation activities and are not, into, holistic doctrinal treatment to the specific gap identified in this report. The imperative therefore is to harvest and consolidate hard-learned insights that more comprehensively address identified transition related challenges in order to affect joint doctrine going forward.

It is important to ensure that lessons learned in OSC-I planning during 2010-2011 be incorporated into joint doctrine. CJCSI 5120.02 offers a path to follow in this regard. Beyond the likely probability that lessons and insights were not inputted through traditional channels, it is also possible that processes for determining which inputs would be incorporated in the updates ongoing at that time may have also been inadequate. Regardless, reasons for these likely causes warrant further attention. One suggestion may be to treat highly developed joint findings differently, as senior DoD leaders did in 2004 for a series of Iraq-related lessons learned findings developed by U.S. Joint Forces Command. In that instance, developed findings were largely incorporated unless compelling opposing evidence was presented.

Though a different situation and context, JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, illustrates the type of details DoD OSC-I transition practitioners indicated that they needed and may offer a template for the detail necessary to treat the identified transition topic. Specifically, the JP 4-05 demobilization section

# Joint Staff/J7 - Joint Force Development Comments

addressed several resourcing requirements: material/equipment, manpower, transportation, facilities, training, host-nation support, legal authorities, and funding. An appendix in JP 4-05 provided additional expanded detail about legal authorities. Similar type of resource and authority guidance would have been useful to DoD OSC-I transition efforts, had it been provided in a more appropriate context.

**Conclusion** - Joint doctrine needs to provide expanded planning consideration details related to transitioning from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities. Joint planning doctrine focused mainly on a rapid military build-up and transition to higher intensity operations; transitioning from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities, such as the context in Iraq, was not as clearly developed. Joint doctrine otherwise generally afforded this type of transition disparate treatment.

Updated doctrine is vital to ensuring effective warfighter support emerges more automatically in future operations. Expanded transition-related doctrine would more comprehensively influence force development efforts, like training and leader development, to ensure that generating force capabilities better match operating force requirements. In the case of transitioning from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities, as was the context of the OSC-I transition in Iraq, important joint doctrine gaps existed that needed to be addressed. Steps must be taken to capture the detailed knowledge gained by OSC-I planners and incorporate it into joint doctrine.

# Joint Staff/J7 - Joint Force Development Comments



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
COMMANDER  
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND  
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200  
NORFOLK, VA 23561-2488

IN REPLY REFER TO  
J02  
23 March 2011

**MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND**

**Subject:** Potential Study to Document Lessons from the Implementation of the  
U.S. Central Command Iraq Transition Plan

*Sir*

1. As the final phase of OPERATION 1003V comes to completion and the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) assumes responsibilities for Department of Defense activities in Iraq, there will be many challenges to overcome and many lessons learned as a result. Though Service lessons learned organizations will continue to collect tactical lessons throughout the period, at present there is not a plan to comprehensively capture the operational and theater-strategic level lessons from this historic period.
2. U.S Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) is uniquely capable to study this important transition. JCOA has had teams forward deployed in theater since the invasion in 2003 and is ready to expand their focus to capture the lessons inclusive of the period from 31 August, 2010, the end of combat operations through 31 December, 2011, transition to OSC-I. A JCOA team could begin the project late-spring 2011, conduct in-theater and CONUS collection during several critical timeframes during the draw down, and complete the study after transfer of responsibility to the OSC-I in early 2012.
3. Recommend you consider using this unique capability to capture lessons learned during the upcoming draw down period. USJFCOM point of contact for this effort is [REDACTED], his action officer is [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

*W, D. Davenport*

D. W. DAVENPORT  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Chief of Staff

*Gr. 2*

# Joint Staff/J7 - Joint Force Development Comments



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES - IRAQ  
BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO AE 09342-1400

USFI COS

29 MAY 2011

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)

SUBJECT: Request to Study OPERATION NEW DAWN (OND) Lessons Learned, United States Force-Iraq (USF-I) to Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) Transition

1. USF-I welcomes United States Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM) offer for its Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) to capture lessons learned from OND and endorses USCENTCOM's draft request per enclosures (1 and 2, respectively).
2. Currently, USF-I has RAND documenting the strategic level transition from a whole of government interagency and policy perspective, and we believe the addition of the JCOA study will help document the operational-level lessons learned.
3. The USF-I points of contact are [REDACTED] and his action officer [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

2 Encls  
1. USJFCOM Letter  
2. USCENTCOM Letter

  
WILLIAM B. GARRETT III  
Major General, USA  
Chief of Staff

Enc 3

# Joint Staff/J7 - Joint Force Development Comments



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD  
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

09 Jun 2011

TO: CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND (USJFCOM)

SUBJECT: Potential Study to Document Lessons from the Implementation of the U.S. Central Command Iraq Transition Plan

Reference: (a) COS USJFCOM Memorandum, Potential Study to Document Lessons from the Implementation of the U.S. Central Command Iraq Transition Plan, 23 March 2011

1. Thank you for your offer regarding transition lessons learned in Iraq. USCENTCOM fully endorses the offer of USJFCOM in-country and CONUS collection of lessons learned during critical timeframes of the pending draw down and transition of Department of Defense activities from the United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) to the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I).
2. The historic completion of the final phase of OPERATION 1003V and the subsequent transition to OSC-I responsibilities will present significant challenges which should be recorded and analyzed at the tactical, operational and theater-strategic levels. Although local command and Service lessons learned collection have been consistent and of high quality for years, this expanded scope and analysis will likely exceed the capabilities of our assets already focused on a professional and effective draw down. Accordingly, we support USJFCOM team collection, both in-country and in CONUS, to adequately capture and study these historic issues inclusive of the period from 31 August 2010 to 31 December 2011.
3. USCENTCOM looks forward to providing the assistance and cooperation necessary to successfully conduct this important study effort. Thank you again for taking the initiative on this important issue.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "mj".

MICHAEL D. JONES  
Major General, U.S. Army

Copy to:  
USF-I COS

## **U.S. Central Command Comments**

Detailed comments received from USCENTCOM are included in the unpublished classified annex and are available upon request.

# United States Forces - Iraq Comments



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES - IRAQ  
BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO AE 09342-1400

22 June 2011

USF-I JS

MEMORANDUM FOR USF-I RFI MGR

SUBJECT: CT - (USCC1115403667) Assessment of Planning for Transitioning the Security Assistance Mission in Iraq from Department of Defense to Department of State Authority


1. USF-I was asked to review and provide a response to the recommendations in the DoD IG D2010-D00SPO-0287.000 Draft Report dated 2 June 2011.
2. There was one recommendation specifically for USF-I. It is listed on p. 9 and recommends that "Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, in coordination with Joint Staff J7, prepare and submit a joint lessons learned report that assesses the utility of a strategic planning group, like Partnership Strategy Group-Iraq, in facilitating complex contingency transition planning." USF-I concurs with this recommendation and will work with JS J7/JCOA during its August transition study to develop these joint lessons learned. JCOA will conduct a second visit in January 2012 and publish its findings in mid 2012. Additionally the Rand Corporation and Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) are conducting transition studies in Iraq in 2011 and 2012, which will capture lessons, challenges and best practices in transitioning at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.
3. Another recommendation, listed on p. 13 recommends that "Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq and as a matter of priority, issue interim theater level campaign, security cooperation, and Iraq specific country planning guidance sufficient to effectively focus and enable efforts of a robust Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq through the 2012 time period." USF-I concurs with this recommendation and is currently working with USCENTCOM in the development of the Iraq Country Plan and its annexes, which will address the priorities listed in the 2.a. recommendation. The projected completion date for the ICP is August 2011.
4. The final recommendation that involves USF-I is listed on p.17 and recommends "the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J7, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Central Command, and Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq develop and sponsor a formal doctrine proposal with a scope that explicitly supports transitioning from stability operations to robust security cooperation activities and assess sufficiency of current

# United States Forces - Iraq Comments

SUBJECT: CT - (USCC1115403667) Assessment of Planning for Transitioning the Security Assistance Mission in Iraq from Department of Defense to Department of State Authority

joint doctrine development processes to rapidly incorporate lessons that emerge from ongoing complex contingency operations.” USF-I concurs with the development of a joint doctrine that addresses transitioning from stability operations to robust security cooperation, which includes establishing an Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) and includes the Department of State in order to make this a synchronized DoD/DoS effort.

5. The DoD IG Special Project Office (SPO) team is scheduled to conduct an on-sight audit on 8 -18 July 2011. The audit is directly related to the OSC transition plan. During this visit, USF-I recommends that the DoD IG further explore USF-I's staff interface with PSG-I (now OCS-I TT), which was not adequately addressed in this draft DoD IG report.
  
6. POC is [REDACTED]



TERRY M. LEE  
COL, FA  
Chief of Staff, J5

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# **Appendix F. Report Distribution**

## **Department of State**

Secretary of State  
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq  
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs  
Inspector General, Department of State

## **Office of the Secretary of Defense**

Secretary of Defense  
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
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Director, Joint Staff  
Director, Operations (J-3)  
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5)  
Director, Joint Force Development (J-7)\*

## **Department of the Army**

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Commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command  
Auditor General, Department of the Army  
Inspector General of the Army

## **Department of the Navy**

Naval Inspector General

## **Department of the Air Force**

Commander, Air Force Security Assistance Center  
Inspector General of the Air Force

## **Combatant Commands**

Commander, U.S. Central Command\*  
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq\*  
Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, U.S. Forces-Iraq\*  
Deputy Commanding General for Support, U.S. Forces-Iraq

\*Recipient of the draft report.

## **Other Defense Organizations**

Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency

## **Other Non-Defense Federal Organizations**

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

## **Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member**

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

Senate Committee on Armed Services

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations

House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

House Committee on Armed Services

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement

House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

House Committee on International Relations

\*Recipient of the draft report.

# Special Plans & Operations

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## General Information

Forward questions or comments concerning this assessment and report and other activities conducted by the Office of Special Plans & Operations to [spo@dodig.mil](mailto:spo@dodig.mil)

Deputy Inspector General for Special Plans & Operations  
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# Inspector General Department of Defense

